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Abstract 
Objective: 
Recent theories propose that global meaning in life (MIL) is based on feelings of coherence, 
purpose, and existential mattering. MIL has also been linked to mental representations—e.g., 
beliefs, values, attitudes, and identities—that serve as ‘meaning frameworks’ for interpreting 
the world and oneself. Combining these proposals, we predicted that beliefs, values, attitudes, 
and identities would foster sense of MIL to the extent that they provide feelings of coherence, 
purpose, and existential mattering.  
Method: 
Using multilevel path analysis, we tested within-person associations of coherence, purpose, 
and existential mattering with sense of MIL across three studies (Study 1: 208 US MTurk 
workers; Study 2: 106 UK university students; Study 3: 296 from a UK nationally-
representative Prolific sample). We explored the generality of these associations across 
mental representation types and individual differences.  
Results:  
Participants derived greater MIL most strongly from mental representations that provided 
sense of purpose, followed by existential mattering. Sense of coherence was less robustly 
related to MIL across mental representation types and religious orientation. 
Conclusions:  
Integrating prior theorizing on MIL, we conclude that mental representations function as 
‘meaning frameworks’ to the extent that they provide feelings of purpose, mattering, and, 
sometimes, coherence. 
Keywords: meaning in life, purpose, coherence, existential mattering, meaning frameworks 
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Meaning in life (MIL) is a key aspect of human wellbeing (Huta & Waterman, 2013) 
that is both conceptually and empirically distinguishable from related wellbeing constructs 
such as life satisfaction or positive and negative affect (Tov & Lee, 2016; Vohs Aaker, & 
Catapano, 2019). MIL research has often focused on people’s subjective, abstract appraisals 
regarding whether their life as a whole is meaningful, i.e., sense of MIL (e.g., Steger, Frazier, 
Oishi & Kaler, 2006), and recent research has begun to identify key predictors of individual 
differences in sense of MIL (e.g., Costin & Vignoles, 2020; George & Park, 2017). However, 
people also judge aspects within their lives as more or less meaningful; in everyday language, 
people talk about meaningful occupations (e.g., being a medical doctor), or meaningless 
pastimes (e.g., watching daytime television), and another line of research has explored 
people’s lay theories of what makes their lives meaningful (e.g., Wong, 1998). Notably, 
individuals ascribe more or less meaning to different aspects of their world-views and their 
self-views; for instance, people perceive some aspects of their identities as more meaningful 
than others, and they typically perceive their more meaningful identity aspects as more self-
defining (Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006). Yet, no previous research to 
our knowledge has looked systematically at what features of mental representations, such as 
beliefs, values, attitudes and identities, predict perceiving them as more meaningful.  
Here, we used a novel within-person methodology to identify the bases on which 
people imbue their beliefs, values, attitudes and identities with higher or lower perceived 
meaningfulness. Combining insights from individual differences (Costin & Vignoles, 2020; 
George & Park, 2017), phenomenological (Wong, 1998), and social cognitive (Heine, Proulx, 
& Vohs, 2006; van den Bos, 2009) literatures, we predicted that beliefs, values, attitudes, and 
identities would foster a sense of MIL to the extent that they provide feelings of coherence, 
purpose, and existential mattering. We also tested whether our findings would hold across 
mental representation types and individual differences (e.g., religiosity).  
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Predicting Individual Differences in Sense of MIL 
Measuring sense of MIL arguably relies on participants having a shared definition of 
“meaning” (Leontiev, 2013), and so researchers have tried to explain what experiences and 
psychological states or traits might inform MIL evaluations (for an overview, see Schnell, 
2011). Some of the suggested predictors of MIL are related to fundamental psychological 
processes. Basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness are seen as 
prerequisites for living a full, satisfying life (Deci & Ryan, 2000), and fulfilment of these is 
linked to seeing one’s life as meaningful (Martela, Ryan, & Steger, 2017). People also need 
to see themselves positively (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008); high self-
esteem provides existential assurance when faced with death-thoughts (e.g., Harmon-Jones et 
al., 1997) and is associated with higher sense of MIL (e.g., Steger et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
self-continuity (i.e., the feeling that one’s past, present, and future are connected), and 
distinctiveness (i.e., seeing oneself as distinguished from others) have been identified as 
fundamental human needs and linked to experiences of meaningfulness (Sedikides & 
Wildschut, 2017; Vignoles, 2009).   
More recently, reviews of precursors of MIL suggested that MIL can be understood as 
primarily deriving from three bases: coherence, purpose, and existential mattering (George & 
Park, 2016; Martela & Steger, 2016). Coherence (also called “comprehension”; George & 
Park, 2016) is about perceptions of order, but specifically applied to self-related experiences; 
thus, coherence involves “making sense of one’s experiences in life” (Reker & Wong, 1988, 
p. 220). Purpose refers to having an overarching life aim that subsumes and organizes other 
goals (McKnight & Kashdan, 2009). Finally, existential mattering (also called “significance”; 
Martela & Steger, 2016) is an evaluation that one’s life is worth living and matters on a wider 
scale (George & Park, 2014; George & Park, 2016). All three proposed bases of meaning 
have been correlated with sense of MIL (George & Park, 2017), but recent evidence suggests 
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that individual differences in sense of MIL are based most strongly on sense of existential 
mattering, and, to a lesser extent, on coherence and purpose (Costin & Vignoles, 2020). To 
complement this body of research, we propose a detailed examination of within-person 
variation in MIL across facets of an individual’s lived experience: Do tripartite accounts 
explain how beliefs, values, attitudes or identities are seen as more or less meaningful? 
Meaning Frameworks: Mental Representations of the World and the Self 
An alternative approach to understanding sense of MIL focuses on the aspects of their 
lives that people find most meaningful. People’s core beliefs, values, attitudes, and identities 
may serve as meaning frameworks—lenses through which they can view and interpret the 
world and themselves (Clifton et al., 2019; Koltko-Rivera, 2004), thus providing a basis for 
experiencing MIL. Philosophers have sometimes defined the experience of MIL as subjective 
attraction to that which is objectively attractive (May, 2015; Wolf, 2010), but criteria for 
defining what is objectively attractive will likely remain elusive (Haidt, 2010; Koethe, 2010). 
Hence, meaning frameworks, influenced by cultural factors and shared within communities 
(e.g., religious belief), may provide grounds for determining worthwhile endeavors. 
According to this view, meaning frameworks would serve to organize people's experiences—
e.g., what is moral or immoral? pleasant or unpleasant?—and link people's lives to important 
goals whose fulfilment would have certain symbolic value (Vess, 2013). An initial attempt to 
identify meaning frameworks comes from studying people’s lay theories of which aspects of 
their lives provide MIL. Mixed methods approaches have yielded lists of experiences that 
may contribute to meaningfulness; these often coalesce around themes of family and 
relationships, spirituality, and certain personal characteristics such as creativity (Delle Fave, 
2013; Steger et al., 2013; Wong, 1998). However, these studies do not explain why these 
particular themes, and not others, would be sources of MIL.  
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Mental representations of the world or of the self may act as meaning frameworks 
because they provide a sense of coherence. Studies have shown that undermining coherence 
even through subtle disruptions such as encountering reverse-colored playing cards, can 
trigger psychophysiological responses indicative of aversive arousal (e.g., Sleegers, Proulx, 
& van Beest, 2015). When the discrepancies are more serious, such as a traumatic event 
perceived as violating either one’s beliefs or goals, then the effects may also be more severe – 
such as experiencing posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms (Park, Mills, & Edmondson, 
2012). Individuals report a higher sense of MIL after exposure to stimuli that correspond to 
pre-existing mental representations, compared to stimuli that do not: For instance, when 
shown pictures of trees arranged in a seasonal order, as opposed to a random order, 
participants reported higher MIL (Heintzelman, Trent, & King, 2013).   
Based on the tripartite accounts of MIL reviewed above, coherence may not provide 
the whole story of what makes mental representations meaningful. Previous research has 
found weak or inconsistent links between individual differences in coherence and subjective 
evaluations of MIL (Costin & Vignoles, 2020). Moreover, complex mental representations, 
such as beliefs, values, attitudes and identities, may be better at simultaneously providing 
coherence, purpose, and existential mattering, and, therefore, may be most relevant to sense 
of MIL. For instance, successfully identifying a piece of furniture as a “chair” may not make 
one’s life more meaningful, whereas believing that people have free will is more likely to do 
so (Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, & Lambert, 2015).  
Current Research 
Integrating tripartite perspectives on MIL with the body of work on meaning 
frameworks would help answer questions that neither perspective can answer on its own. 
Tripartite models may provide an explanation for when mental representations act as meaning 
frameworks, whereas meaning frameworks may allow tripartite models to move beyond 
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overall judgments of MIL and provide a more fine-grained analysis of meaningful life-
aspects. Hence, rather than an individual differences approach predicting who perceives their 
life as more meaningful compared to others, we adopted a within-person methodology 
seeking to predict which of their mental representations individuals would see as more 
meaningful than others. Our central prediction was that participants would find more 
meaningful those of their beliefs, values, attitudes, and identities that provided a stronger 
sense of coherence (H1), purpose (H2), and mattering (H3). A secondary aim was to explore 
to what extent our findings would generalize across types of mental representation and across 
individuals with different beliefs, values, attitudes and levels of MIL. 
To test this, we conducted three studies using a combined idiographic-nomothetic 
approach, whereby each participant first specified a series of their mental representations, and 
then rated each of their own mental representations on a common set of dimensions. 
Participants specified mental representations for each of the following 12 domains: national 
identity, religious identity, role identities in relation to two important others, family identity, 
socioeconomic beliefs, free will/determinism beliefs, beliefs about human nature, abortion 
attitudes, death penalty attitudes, personal values and moral values. The domains were 
selected because either (a) in previous research, people have affirmed their pre-existing 
commitments within these domains as compensatory responses to existential or coherence 
threats (e.g., McGregor et al., 2001), or (b) they have been previously linked to sense of MIL 
either directly (e.g., Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, & Lambert, 2015) or indirectly— 
e.g., moral values differ by political orientation, and conservatives report higher MIL 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Newman, Schwarz, Graham, & Stone, 2018). Participants 
rated each mental representation for meaningfulness, coherence, purpose, and mattering. All 
materials and data can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/VAZ2Y  
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Study 1 
In Study 1, we performed an initial test of our predictions (H1-H3), while also 
controlling for the extent to which mental representations fulfilled six important 
psychological needs: belonging, self-esteem, self-efficacy, distinctiveness, self-continuity, 
and personal control (Galinsky, Whitson, Huang, & Rucker, 2012; Vignoles, 2011). As 
described earlier, these psychological needs have been linked to between-person differences 
in sense of MIL. Furthermore, they have been shown to vary at the within-person level in 
ratings of identity aspects (Droseltis & Vignoles, 2010; Vignoles et al., 2006). Given recent 
tripartite accounts of MIL, we predicted that participants would find more meaningful those 
mental representations that provided a stronger sense of coherence, purpose, and mattering, 
even while controlling for fulfilment of these other important psychological needs. We also 
explored whether our substantive findings would generalize across mental representation 
types (beliefs vs. values vs. attitudes vs. identities), across individual differences in overall 
level of MIL, and across individual differences in mental representation content.  
In previous research, identity aspects which fulfil important psychological needs have 
been perceived as more central (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2006). Similarly, we expected that 
psychological need fulfilment and, in particular, meaningfulness would in turn predict the 
perceived importance of mental representations. This allowed us to explore additionally 
whether coherence, purpose, and existential mattering would predict perceived importance 
independently of meaningfulness—suggesting that the three dimensions may serve important 
functions, beyond their contributions to MIL—or whether coherence, purpose and mattering 
would only predict importance to the extent that they were linked to meaningfulness.  
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Method 
Participants  
We aimed initially for a sample size comparable to those successfully used in 
previous studies with similar multilevel designs (e.g., Droseltis & Vignoles, 2010; Vignoles 
et al., 2006; Vignoles, Manzi, Regalia, Jemmolo, & Scabini, 2008). Based on previous 
research, we expected at least a small-to-medium effect size for the associations of 
coherence, purpose, and mattering with sense of MIL (e.g., George & Park, 2017). Power 
analyses (described in the Results section) show that our achieved sample size was sufficient 
to detect small-to-medium effect sizes across all analyses. 
 We recruited US participants on Amazon MTurk (https://www.mturk.com) for a 
study about “beliefs and worldviews.” Of 372 complete responses, 164 participants were 
removed for failing any one of the three attention checks embedded within the questionnaire 
(e.g., “Please select somewhat disagree”). Incorrect responses to these items were taken to 
indicate non-engagement with the task.1 The final sample consisted of complete responses 
from 208 participants: 108 females, 98 males and 2 self-identified as “gender queer”. Ages 
ranged from 20 to 74 (M= 38.46, SD = 13.22). Most participants were Christian (n = 92), 
followed by atheists (n = 51) and agnostics (n = 43), with the remaining 22 participants 
identifying as Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist or “Other” (specifying that they were “spiritual, but 
not religious”, “Mormon”, etc.). Most participants were in full-time employment (n = 120), 
 
1 Across all three studies, we also ran our main analyses after applying more lenient 
exclusion criteria, where participants were retained if (a) they failed one or no attention 
checks (all studies), or (b) they failed two or fewer attention check (Study 1). Regardless of 
exclusion criteria, the substantive pattern of results remained the same (see Supplemental 
Materials A).  
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followed by part-time or self-employed (n = 50), with the remaining participants either in 
education (n = 24) or retired/unemployed (n = 14).  
Questionnaire and Procedure 
The questionnaire comprised two sections. First, we collected information to 
determine participants’ mental representations in relation to 12 domains: national identity, 
religious identity, role identities in relation to two important others, family identity, 
socioeconomic beliefs, free will/determinism beliefs, beliefs about human nature, abortion 
attitudes, death penalty attitudes, personal values and moral values. Then, the elicited mental 
representations were displayed one at a time, in a randomized order, and participants rated 
each one for sense of MIL and related constructs. Data and study materials for both Study 1 
and Study 2 are available at http://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/VAZ2Y  
Eliciting mental representations. Table 1 shows all mental representation domains 
and response statements used. Participants first completed demographic information, which 
included questions about their religion and their nationality. Afterwards, they were shown 
domain names one at a time, in a random order, followed by the instruction to select a 
statement that reflected their position in the respective domain. For most domains, 
participants were given an option to select “Other” and write their own statement in relation 
to the domain. Then, participants specified their role in relation to two important people in 
their lives. To maintain anonymity, family identity was not defined by participants (i.e., we 
did not ask participants to provide their family name). Instead, the mental representation set 
for all participants was “Being a member of my family”. 
Ratings of mental representations. Participants rated each of their 12 specified 
mental representations separately. Each of their mental representations was displayed at the 
top of a new screen, in random order, followed by a series of questions. We first asked about 
perceived importance, using an attitude importance measure, “How important is this to you 
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personally?” (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005), with responses on a 5-point scale (1 = “Not 
at all important”, 5 = “Extremely important”).  
Then, participants indicated how much they agreed or disagreed with a series of 
statements introduced after the stem “[Believing that / Valuing / Being] [mental 
representation] makes me feel […]”, using a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = 
Strongly agree). First, participants indicated their subjective sense of MIL provided by this 
mental representation (“a sense of meaningfulness in my life”). Next, participants rated to 
what extent they agreed that each mental representation made them feel “a sense of purpose 
and direction in my life” (sense of purpose), “that my life matters in the grand scheme of 
things” (sense of existential mattering) and “a sense of order and coherence in my life” (sense 
of coherence). Finally, to measure fulfilment of other psychological needs, we included 
similarly phrased items measuring self-esteem (“positive about myself”), self-efficacy 
(“competent”), belonging (“included with others”), distinctiveness (“distinctive”), and self-
continuity (“connected to my past and my future”), as well as a measure of personal control 
(“a sense of control”; adapted from Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Thomas 
et al., 2017; Vignoles et al., 2006).  
Results and Discussion 
Analytical Approach  
Given the nested data structure, we tested predictions of within-person variance in 
sense of MIL using multilevel modelling (Hox, 2010). Multilevel path analyses were 
performed using MPlus Version 8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017). All models were estimated 
using full maximum likelihood. All within-person ratings were centered around their 
individual mean so that: (a) the within-person effects would not be confounded with the 
between-person effects, and (b) tests of cross-level moderation would not be confounded with 
between-person interactions (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998; Vignoles et al., 2006).  
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To control for any systematic (i.e., shared across participants) variation in sense of 
MIL across the 12 mental representations domains, we dummy coded the 12 domains at 
Level 1. This resulted in 11 dummy variables with “Death penalty” as the reference domain – 
chosen because of having the lowest average sense of MIL in Study 1 (M = 3.69). These 
dummy coded variables were included in all models. The centering and dummy coding 
decisions described above were followed across all studies in this paper.  
Sensitivity power analysis showed that our achieved sample size was sufficient to 
detect even small effect sizes across our main analyses. When determining sample size in 
nested data (mental representations within individuals) with only lower-level predictors and 
no random slopes, traditional sample size estimations (e.g., Cohen, 1992) can be used, 
provided they are adjusted for the nested data structure (Hox, 2010) using the intraclass 
correlation coefficient (i.e., a measure of the dependence of observations within individuals). 
Since we centred our measures around individual means, the intraclass correlation is 0. This 
results in a straightforward sensitivity calculation showing that, with 95% power and a 
significance level of .05, assuming a maximum of 3 predictors and 17 control variables, we 
could detect an effect size as small as f2 = .01. 
Main Findings 
Level 1 units were mental representations (N = 2495) and Level 2 units were 
individuals (N = 208). The baseline model with only dummy-coded mental representation 
domains as predictors accounted for 26.1% of within-person variance in sense of MIL. Paths 
from the mental representation domains to sense of MIL in baseline models across all studies 
are included in Table 2. As shown in Table 3, intercorrelations between coherence, purpose, 
mattering and sense of MIL ratings were high (.74 to .83). Nevertheless, when partialling out 
the effect of mental representation domain, the residual covariances were lower (.65 to .78), 
suggesting that the high zero-order correlations are partly due to participants consensually 
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rating certain domains systematically higher and other domains lower across all three 
dimensions and sense of MIL. The partial correlations are similar to previous individual-level 
findings showing that these MIL-related constructs are not redundant despite their substantial 
overlap (Costin & Vignoles, 2020; George & Park, 2017). 
As illustrated in Figure 1, we specified Model 1 by using the baseline model and 
adding within-person paths from coherence, purpose, and mattering to sense of MIL. This 
was a perfect-fitting saturated model. Sense of MIL was positively predicted by purpose, β = 
.38, p < .001, 95% CI [.33, .43], mattering, β = .28, p < .001, 95% CI [.24, .32], and, more 
weakly, by coherence, β = .16, p < .001, 95% CI [.12, .20], thus supporting our three main 
hypotheses. This model accounted for 68.9% of within-person variance in sense of MIL.  
In Model 2, we showed that coherence, purpose, and mattering continued to predict 
sense of MIL while controlling for the fulfilment of other important psychological needs 
(belonging, self-esteem, self-efficacy, distinctiveness, self-continuity and personal control), 
thus continuing to support our main hypotheses. All path coefficients are reported in Table 4. 
Sense of MIL was also predicted by self-esteem, and, more weakly, by self-continuity. This 
model accounted for 71.1% of within-person variance in sense of MIL— an increase of just 
2.2% over Model 1.  
Exploring the Generality of Our Findings 
Having shown that mental representations were perceived as most meaningful to the 
extent that they provided a sense of purpose, mattering, and to a lesser extent, coherence, we 
now explored whether our findings would differ by (a) mental representation type, and (b) 
individual-level characteristics (e.g., religious orientation, overall levels of MIL). In these 
models, we did not include the six additional psychological needs explored in Model 2 as 
they made a relatively minor incremental contribution to explained variance in sense of MIL 
above coherence, purpose, and mattering. Moderation was tested by running nested-model 
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comparisons between a constrained and an unconstrained model across levels of each 
moderator. Because this method involved running multiple significance tests, we controlled 
for inflated Type I error, by applying Benjamini and Hochberg’s (1995) false discovery rate 
(FDR) procedure, which involves adjusting the significance threshold sequentially to account 
for the number of tests performed. A full report of all moderation analyses in this paper can 
be found in Supplemental Materials B.  
Moderation by mental representation type. We tested whether the links from 
coherence, purpose, and mattering to sense of MIL would vary across the four mental 
representation types, i.e., beliefs (socioeconomic beliefs, free will/determinism beliefs, 
beliefs about human nature), values (personal values, moral values), attitudes (abortion 
attitudes, death penalty attitudes), or identities (identity roles to two important others, family 
identity, national identity, religious identity). Pathways to sense of MIL showed variation 
across mental representation types, but purpose and mattering remained significant predictors 
throughout. Coherence predicted sense of MIL for beliefs and identity aspects, but not for 
attitudes and values.  
Moderation by Individual-Level Characteristics. Then, we tested the moderating 
effects of individual differences based on selected mental representations content (e.g., 
religious orientation, free will belief). At Level 2, we created categorical variables to capture 
individual differences in the selected mental representation within a subset of domains as 
well as differences in individuals’ tendency to make consistently low or high meaningfulness 
attributions. We tested for cross-level moderation of the paths from coherence, purpose, and 
mattering, to sense of MIL, splitting the data on each of the individual differences variables 
and performing multi-group comparisons. Pathways from coherence, purpose and mattering 
to sense of MIL did not differ significantly as a function of free will beliefs, outlook on 
human nature, or growth versus self-protection values. Moral value orientation emerged as a 
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significant moderator, where coherence was only a significant predictor for those choosing an 
individualising foundation (Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity) as opposed to a binding 
foundation (Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect and Purity/sanctity; Haidt, 2008). Religion 
was also a significant overall moderator yielding an ambiguous result: The pathway from 
coherence to MIL did not reach significance among agnostics, but nor was this pathway 
significantly weaker among agnostics than among atheists or religious participants. We also 
found some differences of emphasis as a function of level of MIL, and social versus personal-
focused values, but coherence, purpose and mattering remained significant predictors of MIL 
throughout these analyses.  
Predicting Perceived Importance of Mental Representations 
To further explore the role of the three proposed meaning bases for how mental 
representations are perceived, we tested whether coherence, purpose, and mattering would 
predict perceived importance of mental representations through sense of MIL. To test this, we 
added perceived importance as an outcome of the other variables in Model 1, and Model 2. 
All three proposed bases of meaning predicted importance indirectly through MIL, but 
coherence and purpose also predicted perceived importance directly. When controlling for the 
fulfillment of other psychological needs in Model 2, a similar pattern emerged, but now 
purpose predicted perceived importance only indirectly. A full report of these mediation 
models can be found in Supplemental Materials C.  
Summary 
Study 1 provided first evidence that mental representations are judged as more 
meaningful if they give a sense of coherence (H1), purpose (H2) and mattering (H3). Purpose 
and mattering predicted MIL across all analyses. These findings persisted when controlling 
for the fulfilment of other psychological needs that contribute to one’s wellbeing (e.g., self-
esteem), and they held across mental representation types, as well as individual differences in 
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religious orientation, lower and higher overall meaningfulness attributions, and in all further 
moderation analyses (see Supplemental Materials B). In contrast, coherence predicted sense 
of MIL (H1) only when participants rated beliefs and identities, rather than values or 
attitudes, and this pathway did not reach significance among agnostics.  
Study 1 findings also suggest that coherence and purpose may serve important 
functions in addition to their role in the experience of MIL, whereas mental representations 
associated with mattering may be important specifically because they grant a sense of MIL. 
Coherence predicted perceived importance independently of meaningfulness, suggesting that 
coherence may be important for reasons not related to MIL. Similarly, purpose directly 
predicted perceived importance in the model that only included the three facets of MIL. As 
the direct path became non-significant when controlling for the fulfilment of other 
psychological needs, this suggests that the importance of purpose outside its relation to MIL 
may overlap with the satisfaction of one or more of the other psychological needs measured.  
Study 2 
Study 1 was our first study in a novel area, and so in Study 2 we aimed to replicate the 
key findings among a different sample (university students) within a different cultural context 
(UK). US culture emphasizes mastery values (i.e., values related to self-assertion and goal 
pursuit) more than other cultures (Schwartz, 2006), which might have explained the 
prominent role of purpose for sense of MIL in Study 1. Although similar, UK culture has a 
greater focus on intellectual and emotional autonomy values (Schwartz, 2006). Moreover, 
UK participants—perhaps especially university students—are less likely to be religious than 
US participants (Evans, 2018). In addition, students represent a younger age group than 
MTurk workers. Around 70% of those enrolling in higher education in the UK were 24 or 
younger (Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2019) whereas the average US MTurk worker 
is around 35-36 years old (Burnham, Le & Piedmont, 2018). Being less religious and younger 
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is associated with lower meaning in life (Hicks & King, 2008; Steger et al., 2006; Steger, 
Oishi, & Kashdan, 2009). Hence, replicating the pathways from coherence, purpose and 
mattering to sense of MIL among a younger, less religious sample with potentially different 
value priorities would provide evidence of the robustness of our findings.2 
The current design asks participants to make metacognitive judgments (i.e., to think 
about the content of their thoughts). Hence, in addition to replicating our Study 1 moderation 
analyses, we also tested whether associations between dimensions and sense of MIL would 
generalise as a function of individual differences in self-reflection (i.e., how much 
participants think about their thoughts and feelings) and self-insight (i.e., how much 
participants perceived they were aware of their thoughts and feelings).  
Method 
Participants 
 In Study 1, the smallest substantive effect in the main analysis was for coherence 
which accounted for 2.1% of variance in sense of MIL (f2 = 0.073). A sample size of 16 
 
2 Initially, we also hoped to collect longitudinal data in Study 2. However, the second 
wave of our study coincided with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the UK and we 
were able to collect only 19 usable responses at Time 2. Hence, we report the Time 1 data 
only in this paper. Cross-lag analyses between Time 1 and Time 2 responses are reported in 
Supplemental Materials D, but should be interpreted with caution given the sample size. 
3 Calculated using Cohen’s f2 formula for calculating local effect size (Cohen, 1988; 
Syela, Rose, Dierker, Hedeker, & Mermelstein, 2012):  
𝑓2 =
𝑅𝐴𝐵
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participants yielding 188 mental representations would be required to observe the same effect 
using a significance level of .05 and with 95% power. In order to allow for potential case 
exclusions due to careless responding tendencies and for data splitting in order to test 
moderation effects, we aimed to over-recruit.  
We recruited 188 responses from UK university students enrolled in a psychology 
course in exchange for research participation credits. We applied the same exclusion criteria 
as in Study 1 and removed 82 participants who failed any of the two attention checks 
embedded within the questionnaire. The final sample consisted of 106 participants yielding 
1272 mental representations: participants were 87 females, 18 males, and one who identified 
as “non-binary.”  Participants were aged between 18 to 27 years (M = 19.55, SD = 1.49), 
predominantly British (n = 88), with most identifying as atheist (n = 64) or agnostic (n = 14).  
Questionnaire and Procedure 
The procedures for eliciting mental representations were the same as in Study 1. We 
also used the same items to capture ratings of sense of coherence, purpose, mattering, and 
MIL for each mental representation. In addition, we measured self-reflection (12 items, e.g., 
“I frequently take time to reflect on my thoughts”; α = .92) and self-insight (7 items, e.g., “I 
usually know why I feel the way I do”; α = .81; Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002), using a 
7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree). 
 
Here, 𝑅𝐴𝐵
2  is the proportion of variance accounted for by a set of variables that include 
the target predictor (B), whereas  𝑅𝐴
2 is the proportion of variance accounted for by all other 
variables not including B. 
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Results and Discussion 
Main Findings  
Specified models had 1272 Level 1 units (mental representation) and 106 Level 2 
units (individuals). The baseline model with only mental representation domains predicting 
sense of MIL accounted for 34.1% within-person variance. As shown in Table 5, 
intercorrelations between coherence, purpose, mattering, and sense of MIL ratings as well as 
their residual covariances after controlling for mental representation domains were 
comparable to those observed in Study 1 (cf. Table 3). 
Sense of coherence, purpose, and existential mattering were added as predictors of 
sense of MIL to the baseline model. As in Study 1, sense of MIL was most strongly predicted 
by purpose, β = .37, p < .001, 95% CI [.31, .42], followed by existential mattering, β = .23, p 
< .001, 95% CI [.18, .28], and coherence, β = .20, p < .001, 95% CI [.15, 25]. This model 
accounted for 67.3% of within-person variance in sense of MIL. 
Exploring the Generality of Our Findings 
As in Study 1, we conducted a series of moderation analyses to test the generality of 
our findings across mental representation types, and individual differences.  
Moderation by mental representation type. We tested whether the paths would 
differ by mental representation type. While associations between sense of MIL and each of 
the three predictors varied in strength across mental representation types, coherence, purpose 
and mattering all remained significant regardless of whether participants were rating beliefs, 
values, attitudes, or identities.  
Moderation by Individual-Level Characteristics. We used the same approach as in 
Study 1, creating categorical variables capturing individual differences based on mental 
representation content. In addition, we created Level 2 categorical variables for self-reflection 
and self-insight tendencies by splitting participants around median self-reflection scores and 
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median self-insight scores. Pathways from coherence, purpose and mattering to sense of MIL 
did not differ significantly as a function of overall MIL attributions, outlook on human 
nature, social versus personal values, or as a function of self-reflection or self-insight 
tendencies. There were some differences in strength of associations as a function of free will 
belief and religiosity. Coherence, purpose and mattering remained significant predictors of 
MIL throughout these analyses, with two exceptions. First, the path from coherence to MIL 
was not significant for participants with a personal rather than a social focus in their selected 
values, but, as mentioned earlier, there was no evidence of overall moderation. Second, as in 
Study 1, the pathway from coherence to MIL was not significant across all religious 
categories – this time, it was non-significant among religious people. This pathway was not 
significantly weaker than for the other two religious groups.  
Summary 
Using a different sample (students at a UK University), we replicated the findings 
from Study 1: all three dimensions of coherence (H1), purpose (H2) and existential mattering 
(H3) uniquely predicted sense of MIL. These findings did not vary significantly by individual 
differences in self-reflection and self-insight. Of the three dimensions, coherence was again 
less reliably predictive of sense of MIL, with religious participants seemingly not relying on 
sense of coherence for judging the meaningfulness of their mental representations. As in 
Study 1, sense of mattering and purpose remained significant predictors of MIL in all 
analyses. 
Study 3 
While Study 1 and Study 2 suggested that our findings would generalize to different 
samples, neither of our samples were representative of the general population of their 
respective countries. US MTurk workers and UK university students tend to be younger, 
more educated, less religious, and more liberal than the average US/UK person (Dinham, 
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Francis, & Shaw, 2017; Hanel & Vione, 2016; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). As such, we 
preregistered Study 3 (https://bit.ly/2W6iJAN) aiming to confirm our pattern of findings 
using a nationally-representative UK sample.  
We also aimed to test whether our pattern of results would remain after controlling for 
a recently-proposed fourth dimension of MIL: experiential appreciation (EA)—describing the 
extent to which one finds value and enjoyment in one’s experiences (Flanagan et al., 2019).  
Experiential appreciation has been found to contribute to between-person sense of MIL 
independently of the other three dimensions. We tested whether EA would predict within-
person sense of MIL, and whether the original three dimensions would remain predictive 
after including EA in the model.  
Method 
Participants 
As explained in Study 2, finding our smallest substantive effect only required a small 
sample of 188 mental representations (or 16 participants). When splitting data into categories 
to explore the generality of our findings, we also aimed to have sufficient participants in our 
smallest group – the smallest grouping averaged across Study 1 and Study 2 included 6.93% 
of total participants (see Supplemental Materials B). Assuming similar groupings in our 
sample, we would need to have at least 231 participants for adequately powered tests. We 
over-recruited, hoping to have 300 complete responses in the final sample (after exclusions).  
We recorded 414 complete responses on Prolific (https://www.prolific.co/) from a 
nationally-representative UK sample cross-stratified by age (18-27, 28-37, 38-47, 48-57, and 
58+), gender (male and female), and ethnicity (White, Mixed, Asian, Black and Other). As 
specified in the preregistration, we applied the same exclusion criteria from Study 1 and 
Study 2 to remove 118 participants who failed any of the two attention checks embedded 
within the questionnaire. The final sample consisted of 296 participants: 151 females, 143 
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males, and two participants who identified as “non-binary.” Participants were aged between 
18 to 82 years (M = 44.58, SD = 15.78), predominantly White (n = 242), followed by Asian 
(n = 21), Black (n = 15), Mixed (n = 14), as well as two participants who classified 
themselves as “British/Turkish” and “Arab”, respectively, and two participants who preferred 
not to say (n = 2).  Most participants identified as atheist (n = 121) or agnostic (n = 49). 
Unsurprisingly, most religious participants identified as Christian (n = 94) with the remaining 
32 identifying as Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, or self-specified as “spiritual”.  
Questionnaire and Procedure 
The procedure for eliciting mental representations was the same as in Study 1 and 2 
and used the same items for coherence, purpose, mattering, and MIL. We added an additional 
rating of existential appreciation associated with each mental representation (“an appreciation 
for the beauty and variety of my life experiences”).  
Because data was collected in July 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic, we also 
asked questions about participants’ subjective concerns about the pandemic by adapting items 
from existing measures (Sloan et al., 2021; Taylor et al., 2020): fear of contamination (3 
items, α = .81 , e.g., “I am worried that if I touched something in a public space (e.g., 
handrail, door handle), I would catch the virus”), traumatic stress (3 items, α = .86 , e.g., “I 
had trouble concentrating because I kept thinking about the virus”), and altruistic concern (3 
items, α = .86,  e.g., “I am worried about other people in the UK becoming ill from COVID-
19”)4. 
 
4 For exploratory reasons, we also measured whether participants were self-isolating 
or shielding and perceived pandemic seriousness and perceived changes to lifestyle due to the 
pandemic.  
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Results and Discussion 
Main Findings  
Specified models had 3552 Level 1 units (mental representation) and 296 Level 2 
units (individuals). The baseline model with only mental representation domains accounted 
for 29.9 % within-person variance. As shown in Table 6, the pattern of correlations between 
coherence, purpose, mattering and sense of MIL was similar to that obtained in the previous 
two studies (cf. Table 3, Table 5). As expected, experiential appreciation was also strongly 
correlated with all other dimensions and sense of MIL.  
When adding coherence, purpose, and mattering as predictors of sense of MIL to the 
baseline model, we found similar a pattern as in the previous two studies: sense of MIL was 
most strongly predicted by purpose, β = .41, p < .001, 95% CI [.37, .44], followed by 
mattering, β = .17, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, .21], and coherence, β = .17, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, 
.21]. This pattern of findings persisted after controlling for experiential appreciation; sense of 
MIL was predicted by purpose, β = .36, p < .001, 95% CI [.32, .40], mattering, β = .13, p < 
.001, 95% CI [.10, .17], and coherence, β = .15, p < .001, 95% CI [.12, .19]. Interestingly, 
experiential mattering was also a unique predictor, β = .13, p < .001, 95% CI [.10, .17]. 
Exploring the Generality of Our Findings 
Moderation analyses were conducted as in Study 1 and Study 2.  
Moderation by mental representation type. As in Study 2, associations between 
sense of MIL and coherence, purpose, and mattering varied in strength across mental 
representation types, but all three predictors remained significant regardless of whether 
participants were rating beliefs, values, attitudes, or identities.  
Moderation by Individual-Level Characteristics. Pathways from coherence, 
purpose and mattering to sense of MIL did not differ significantly as a function of overall 
MIL attributions, different COVID-19 fears and concerns, religiosity, free will belief, moral 
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orientation values, outlook on human nature, or social versus personal values. There were 
some differences in strength of association as a function of growth versus self-protection 
focus. Nevertheless, all three dimensions remained significant predictors of MIL across all 
analyses with one equivocal exception: those with binding moral foundations did not seem to 
rely on mattering when making MIL judgements, but this path was not significantly weaker 
than for those with individualising moral foundations and so the nonsignificant path for this 
relatively small subset of our sample may have been a Type II error.    
Summary 
Using a nationally-representative UK sample, we replicated findings from the 
previous two studies: coherence (H1), purpose (H2) and existential mattering (H3) uniquely 
predicted sense of MIL. These findings persisted even after controlling for a potential fourth 
dimension of MIL: experiential appreciation – which also emerged as a unique predictor. 
Purpose remained the strongest predictor of MIL, but it was less clear whether mattering 
remained uniformly predictive of meaning frameworks; we did not find evidence that those 
who made moral judgements based on ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, or purity/sanctity 
relied on mattering when judging the meaningfulness of their mental representations. 
General Discussion 
Across three studies we attempted a much-needed integration between research on 
meaning frameworks and on predictors of sense of MIL. By using recent tripartite models of 
MIL (George & Park, 2016; Martela & Steger, 2016), we showed which mental 
representations act as meaning frameworks: those that provide sense of purpose (H2) and, 
less consistently, coherence (H1) and existential mattering (H3). Concurrently, our findings 
extend ongoing efforts to understand what predicts MIL. Previous studies have focused on 
predicting individual differences in overall life judgments of MIL (e.g., George & Park, 
2017). Here, we found evidence that coherence, purpose, and mattering predict sense of MIL 
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when this is assessed at a lower level of construal than overall life judgments – i.e., when 
looking at meaningful aspects within people’s lives.  
The Role of Coherence, Purpose and Mattering for Meaning Frameworks  
Purpose (H2) showed the strongest and most consistent associations with sense of 
MIL. These associations persisted when controlling for the fulfilment of other psychological 
needs that contribute to one’s wellbeing (e.g., self-esteem), and they held across mental 
representation types, as well as individual differences in religious orientation, lower and 
higher overall meaningfulness attributions, and in all further moderation analyses (see 
Supplemental Materials B).  
Mattering (H3) followed a similar pattern to purpose, but showed weaker associations 
– this differs from individual-level findings where mattering emerged as the key predictor of 
sense of MIL (Costin & Vignoles, 2020). One explanation could be that dimensions are 
differentially important depending on levels of abstraction. Beliefs, values, attitudes, and 
identities may be meaningful primarily to the extent that they are seen to further life goals, 
whereas one’s life, judged in its entirety, may be judged as meaningful mainly to the extent 
that it is seen as mattering within a grander framework (i.e., the Universe).   
Despite the extensive focus on coherence in the literature on MIL (e.g., Heintzelman 
& King, 2014) and meaning frameworks (e.g., Heine et al, 2006), H1 received only partial 
support. The contribution of coherence to sense of MIL was significant overall, but not robust 
across mental representation types and across groups of participants. Coherence, in the 
broader sense of the word, is likely a feature of the formation and maintenance of all mental 
representations, since humans may be fundamentally attuned to see patterns, make 
predictions, and update those predictions (Clark, 2013). Nevertheless, it is unclear whether 
explicit reports about the coherence of mental representations describe the same experience 
as that induced by the more subtle primes used in the meaning literature – for instance, in 
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research showing that exposure to familiar visual or textual patterns increases sense of MIL 
(Heintzelman et al., 2013). Alternatively, individuals may be more likely to form meaning 
frameworks from mental representations that grant coherence when a person’s sense of 
coherence is low or undermined (e.g., Heine et al., 2006). Opportunities to make life feel 
more coherent might seem less appealing to those who have already achieved some baseline 
level of perceived coherence.  
Theoretical and methodological implications 
Unlike other research into situational meaning that looked at concrete occurrences 
(e.g., traumatic events; Park et al., 2012) or specific life domains (e.g., engagement in work 
activities; Steger, Dik, & Duffy, 2012), mental representations are universal and pervasive 
within people’s lives. Certain types of mental representations about the world as a whole may 
be stable across situations, consistent across time, and may shape personality (see primal 
world beliefs; Clifton et al., 2018). Showing that mental representations can serve as meaning 
frameworks suggests new ways in which MIL judgments could shape behavior – between 
beliefs, values, attitudes, and identities that each prescribe different ways of behaving, would 
a person be more likely to act in line with a more meaningful mental representation than a 
less meaningful one?  
The within-person technique used in our studies has important theoretical and 
methodological advantages above modelling relationships between meaning bases and sense 
of MIL at the individual level (cf., Costin & Vignoles, 2020; George & Park, 2017). Because 
participants made ratings of multiple mental representations, rather than judging the 
meaningfulness of their lives as a whole, they were less likely to anticipate the focus of our 
analyses. Consequently, our results are less likely to be explained by socially desirable 
response styles that often contaminate self-report measures of positive psychological 
functioning (Heintzelman, Trent, & King, 2015). Concurrently, a statistical focus on within-
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person variation insulates results from individual differences in scale usage, such as 
acquiescent responding (i.e., “the tendency to agree with questionnaire statements regardless 
of content”; Winkler, Kanouse, & Ware, 1982, p. 555).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Despite these advantages of our within-person design, some limitations should be 
addressed in future work. First, in the interest of reducing respondent fatigue, we used single-
item measures of meaning variables. When measuring complex psychological constructs, 
single-item measures are often less reliable and capture less information (Bergkvist & 
Rossiter, 2007; Loo & Kelts, 1998). However, in some cases, they can capture psychological 
phenomena as reliably as their multi-item counterparts (e.g., self-esteem; Robins, Hending, & 
Trzesniewski, 2001). Existing measures of sense of MIL feature redundancy in their item 
content (e.g., “My life as a whole has meaning,” “My entire existence is full of meaning”; 
Costin & Vignoles, 2020; Wong, 1998), which may suggest that single-item measures could 
be appropriate alternatives to the full scales. Second, the current within-person correlational 
findings should be supplemented with experimental or longitudinal research with causally 
sensitive designs to capture the relationships between meaning dimensions and sense of MIL 
(see Supplemental Materials D for some preliminary evidence).  
Concluding Remarks 
People perceive the world and themselves through mental representations of varying 
types and content. These culturally and socially defined lenses through which we see the 
world and ourselves can provide existential comfort and grant assurance of our place within 
the world, making us feel not only that life is coherent and orderly, but also that there are 
important goals that can give us a sense of purpose, and that our lives can matter despite 
evidence to the contrary. In so doing, these worldviews and self-views provide the foundation 
on which we construct meaningful lives.
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Tables 
Table 1  
Mental representations domains with response statements displayed to participants, and corresponding theoretical sources 
Domain Response options Theoretical sources 
Free will / 
determinism 
beliefs 
One has complete control over the decisions one makes; one can overtake any obstacles if they truly want to 
One could have free will even if scientists discovered all of the laws that govern all human  
Every event that has ever occurred, including human decisions and actions, was completely determined by 
prior events 
Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random; what happens to people is a matter of chance 
Fate determines one’s successes and failures 
Other 
Free will scales (Nadelhoffer, 
Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada, 
& Ross, 2014; Paulhus & 
Carey, 2011); Social Axioms 
Survey, SAS II – Fate 
Control scale (Leung et al., 
2012) 
   
Beliefs about 
human nature 
Powerful people tend to exploit others 
The only way to get ahead is to take advantage of others 
People are inherently generous and kind-hearted 
Most people mean well and can be trusted 
Other 
Social Axioms Survey, SAS 
II - Social Cynicism scale 
(Leung et al., 2012) 
   
Socioeconomic 
beliefs 
It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom 
We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally 
Success depends more on the circumstances into which one is born than hard work 




Orientation (Jost & 
Thompson, 2000); beliefs in 
meritocracy (Zimmerman & 
Reyna, 2013) 
   
Abortion 
attitudes 
Abortion should be legal and readily accessible to people requesting it 
To protect the rights of the unborn baby, legal abortion should never be available 
Abortion should only be allowed only in case of rape, incest, or life-threatening situations 
Other 
Adapted from items used in 
McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, 
and Spencer (2001) 
   
Death penalty 
attitudes 
A murderer deserves to die 
Capital punishment is absolutely never justified 
Adapted from items used in 
McGregor et al. (2001) 
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Capital punishment is necessary for some crimes 
Other 
   
Personal values POWER (social power, authority, wealth) 
ACHIEVEMENT (success, capability, ambition, influence on people and events) 
HEDONISM (gratification of desires, enjoyment in life, self-indulgence) 
STIMULATION (daring, a varied and challenging life, an exciting life) 
SELF-DIRECTION (creativity, freedom, curiosity, independence, choosing one's own goals) 
UNIVERSALISM (broad-mindedness, beauty of nature and arts, social justice, a world at peace, equality, 
wisdom, unity with nature, environmental protection) 
BENEVOLENCE (helpfulness, honesty, forgiveness, loyalty, responsibility) 
TRADITION (respect for tradition, humbleness, accepting one's portion in life, devotion, modesty) 
CONFORMITY (obedience, honoring parents and elders, self-discipline, politeness) 
SECURITY (national security, family security, social order, cleanliness, reciprocation of favors) 
Short Schwartz Value Survey 
(SSVS; Lindeman & 
Verkasalo, 2005); based on 
Schwartz’s (1992) Value 
Theory 
   
Moral values One should avoid causing physical or emotional harm to others 
One should not treat some people differently than others; all people’s rights need to be respected and they 
should be treated fairly 
One should be loyal and place the interests of the group above one’s own 
One should fulfil his or her duties and show respect for legitimate authorities 
Traditions should be upheld as they serve important roles within one's community 
When one makes moral judgments, one must also consider whether things rise to standards of purity and 
decency 
Adapted from Graham, 
Haidt, and Nosek (2009); 
based on Moral Foundations 
Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004) 
   
Role to 
important other 
1 & 2 
The name of a person important to you (e.g., Jim): _____ 
Who you are in relation to that person (e.g., friend): _____ 
- 
   
Religious 
identity 
Your religion: Atheist, Agnostic, Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Other - 
   
National identity Your nationality: ______ - 
   
Family identity Being a member of my family [fixed wording for all participants] - 
Note. For the option Other, participants wrote their own statement.  
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Table 2  
Standardized paths from the dummy-coded mental representation domains to sense of MIL in the baseline models for all three studies and 
descriptive statistics for MIL-related variables  
 
 Path coefficients for sense of MIL  Means (SDs)  
Domain b β [95% CI] p  Sense of MIL Coherence Purpose Mattering Experiential 
appreciation 
 Study 1 
Role to important other 1 2.24 .42 [.37, .46]  < .001  5.94 (1.38) 5.82 (1.27) 5.74 (1.36) 5.64 (1.46) - 
Personal values 2.17 .40 [.36,.45] < .001  5.87 (1.30) 5.86 (1.20) 5.90 (1.18) 5.53 (1.49) - 
Role to important other 2  2.10 .39 [.34,.43] < .001  5.79 (1.31) 5.57 (1.34) 5.52 (1.42) 5.51 (1.48) - 
Family identity 1.82 .34 [.29, .38] < .001  5.51 (1.72) 5.51 (1.76) 5.38 (1.78) 5.41 (1.81) - 
Moral values 1.79 .33 [.29, .38] < .001  5.49 (1.35) 5.39 (1.35) 5.24 (1.45) 5.07 (1.60) - 
Socioeconomic beliefs 1.50 .28 [.23, .32] < .001  5.20 (1.56) 5.17 (1.59) 5.18 (1.56) 4.99 (1.69) - 
Free will/ determinism beliefs 1.14 .21 [.17, .26] < .001  4.84 (1.73) 4.85 (1.83) 4.78 (1.80) 4.71 (1.82) - 
Religious identity 1.08 .20 [.15, .25] < .001  4.77 (1.81) 4.89 (1.83) 4.70 (1.91) 4.65 (2.01) - 
National identity 0.78 .14 [.01, .19] < .001  4.47 (1.78) 4.63 (1.79) 4.35 (1.78) 4.24 (1.83) - 
Abortion attitudes 0.32 .06 [.01, .10] .012  4.01 (1.66) 3.97 (1.72) 3.77 (1.67) 3.94 (1.78) - 
Beliefs about human nature 0.22 .04 [-.01, .09] .079  3.92 (1.78) 3.91 (1.83) 3.76 (1.80) 3.77 (1.86) - 
Death penalty attitudes - - -  3.69 (1.72) 3.80 (1.77) 3.34 (1.61) 3.69 (1.78) - 
 Study 2 
Role to important other 1 2.06 .40 [.34, .46] <.001  6.10 (1.18) 5.84 (1.24) 5.81 (1.22) 5.85 (1.45) - 
Role to important other 2  1.70 .33 [.27, .39] <.001  5.75 (1.30) 5.52 (1.27) 5.40 (1.48) 5.61 (1.36) - 
Personal values 1.71 .33 [.27, .39] <.001  5.75 (1.06) 5.28 (1.29) 5.61 (1.19) 5.20 (1.33) - 
Family identity 1.64 .32 [.26, .38] <.001  5.69 (1.31) 5.37 (1.36) 5.46 (1.37) 5.52 (1.42) - 
Moral values 1.36 .27 [.21, .33] <.001  5.41 (1.16) 5.05 (1.23) 5.16 (1.26) 4.79 (1.36) - 
Socioeconomic beliefs 0.81 .16 [.10, .22] <.001  4.86 (1.62) 4.42 (1.63) 4.82 (1.63) 4.46 (1.70) - 
Abortion attitudes 0.44 .09 [.03, .15] .005  4.49 (1.53) 4.34 (1.47) 4.04 (1.36) 4.25 (1.51) - 
Free will/ determinism beliefs 0.43 .08 [.02, .14] .007  4.47 (1.69) 4.07 (1.78) 4.35 (1.66) 4.26 (1.69) - 
Death penalty attitudes - - -  4.05 (1.43) 4.00 (1.42) 3.79 (1.31) 4.01 (1.53) - 
Religious identity -0.12 -.02 [-.08, .04] .438  3.92 (1.65) 4.20 (1.63) 4.11 (1.70) 3.85 (1.66) - 
National identity -0.14 -.03 [-.09, .03] .370  3.91 (1.51) 3.79 (1.60) 3.75 (1.54) 3.65 (1.44) - 
Beliefs about human nature -0.36 -.07 [-.13, -.01] .023  3.69 (1.62) 3.54 (1.58) 3.47 (1.55) 3.26 (1.50) - 
 Study 3 
Role to important other 1 2.09 .42 [.38, .45] <.001  6.18 (1.05) 5.83 (1.21) 5.85 (1.21) 5.83 (1.34) 5.92 (1.12) 
MEANINGFUL MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS  41 
Role to important other 2  1.87 .37 [.34, .41] <.001  5.96 (1.29) 5.48 (1.40) 5.59 (1.41) 5.68 (1.39) 5.59 (1.36) 
Personal values 1.85 .37 [.33, .41] <.001  5.94 (0.96) 5.45 (1.22) 5.63 (1.21) 5.34 (1.29) 5.58 (1.29) 
Family identity 1.73 .35 [.31, .38] <.001  5.82 (1.43) 5.55 (1.44) 5.59 (1.53) 5.59 (1.56) 5.44 (1.51) 
Moral values 1.39 .28 [.24, .31] <.001  5.48 (1.28) 5.23 (1.23) 5.10 (1.30) 4.95 (1.46) 5.04 (1.33) 
Socioeconomic beliefs 1.10 .22 [.18, .26] <.001  5.18 (1.54) 4.74 (1.55) 4.97 (1.59) 4.66 (1.57) 4.80 (1.57) 
Free will/ determinism beliefs 0.75 .15 [.11, .19] <.001  4.84 (1.53) 4.54 (1.63) 4.77 (1.58) 4.57 (1.61) 5.04 (1.37) 
Religious identity 0.39 .08 [.04, .11] <.001  4.47 (1.68) 4.57 (1.66) 4.47 (1.66) 4.35 (1.71) 4.78 (1.59) 
Beliefs about human nature 0.25 .05 [.01, .09] .009  4.34 (1.78) 4.09 (1.68) 3.97 (1.68) 3.99 (1.77) 4.03 (1.78) 
National identity 0.12 .02 [-.01, .06] .203  4.21 (1.68) 4.10 (1.59) 3.91 (1.62) 3.72 (1.61) 4.19 (1.65) 
Abortion attitudes 0.12 .02 [-.01, .06] .229  4.20 (1.48) 3.98 (1.38) 3.83 (1.43) 4.01 (1.52) 3.97 (1.44) 
Death penalty attitudes - - -  4.09 (1.42) 4.04 (1.46) 3.61 (1.40) 4.01 (1.52) 3.69 (1.48) 
Note. Reference mental representation domain is Death penalty. Mental representations in descending order of sense of MIL means in each of 
the three studies  
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Table 3  
Study 1 correlations between all within-person ratings  
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Importance - .60 .51 .53 .48 .36 .53 .45 .35 .34 .37 
2 Sense of MIL .68 - .65 .72 .69 .43 .63 .49 .43 .46 .46 
3 Coherence .60 .74 - .78 .70 .42 .60 .52 .44 .48 .52 
4 Purpose .62 .80 .83 - .77 .44 .65 .52 .48 .51 .50 
5 Existential mattering .58 .77 .77 .83 - .42 .61 .50 .50 .45 .50 
6 Belonging .45 .54 .53 .54 .53 - .56 .46 .37 .43 .39 
7 Self-esteem .61 .72 .69 .74 .70 .64 - .63 .52 .48 .55 
8 Self-efficacy .52 .58 .59 .60 .58 .51 .69 - .52 .45 .60 
9 Distinctiveness .45 .56 .56 .60 .57 .47 .63 .59 - .51 .52 
10 Self-continuity .44 .59 .60 .63 .61 .55 .60 .51 .62 - .42 
11 Control .44 .53 .58 .57 .55 .44 .61 .65 .58 .47 - 
Note. Below the diagonal: zero-order correlations; above the diagonal: residual covariances after controlling for mental representation domain. 
All correlations were significant at p <.001. Correlations for MIL ratings and potential bases of MIL judgments in bold. All correlations were 
significant at p <.001. 
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Table 4 
Study 1 paths from coherence, purpose, and mattering to sense of MIL, on their own (Model 
1), and while controlling for the satisfaction of other psychological needs (Model 2)  
 
Predictor b β [95% CI] p 
 Model 1 
Coherence .16 .16 [.12, .20] < .001 
Purpose .37 .38 [.33, .43]  < .001 
Existential mattering .29 .28 [.24, .32] < .001 
Sense of MIL - - - 
 Model 2 
Coherence .11 .11 [.07, .15] <.001 
Purpose .29 .30 [.25, .34] <.001 
Mattering .23 .22 [.18, .26] <.001 
Belonging .03 .02 [-.01, .05] .129 
Self-esteem .21 .19 [.15, .23] <.001 
Self-efficacy .02 .02 [-.02, .05] .273 
Distinctiveness  -.01 .00 [-.04, .03] .809 
Self-continuity .04 .04 [.00, .07] .034 
Control .01 .01 [-.02, .04] .576 
Sense of MIL  - - 
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Table 5 
Correlations between all within-person ratings in Study 2 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 
1 Sense of MIL - .59 .66 .59 
2 Coherence .71 - .68 .55 
3 Purpose .77 .76 - .61 
4 Existential mattering .71 .68 .72 - 
 
Note. Below the diagonal: zero-order correlations; above the diagonal: residual covariances 
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Table 6 





Note. Below the diagonal: zero-order correlations; above the diagonal: residual covariances 
after controlling for mental representation domain. All correlations were significant at p <.001. 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Sense of MIL - .58 .65 .56 .53 
2 Coherence .68 - .72 .64 .58 
3 Purpose .75 .79 - .69 .64 
4 Existential mattering .68 .73 .77 - .61 
5 Experiential appreciation .65 .68 .74 .70 - 
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Figures 
 

































Figure 1. Study 1 Model 1 showing paths from coherence, purpose, and mattering to sense of 
MIL and perceived importance. Path models showing standardized path coefficients. Dummy 
coded mental representations are included in the model but not displayed for ease of 
interpretation. Solid lines show significant paths and dotted lines show non-significant paths. 
**p <.01,*** p < .001. 
